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I. Introduction
In addition to its scenic beauty, low population, and Cheyenne Frontier
Days—the Daddy of ‘em All—the State of Wyoming is a leading trust situs.1
* J.D., University of Wyoming College of Law, Class of 2019. I would like to thank Professor
James Delaney for his knowledge and guidance throughout this project. Thank you to Aaron
Tomisich for sharing his decanting expertise. I would also like to thank the Student Editors of the
Wyoming Law Review for their unwavering efforts and unrelenting edits. Most of all, I would like to
thank my family and Kate Mercer for their unconditional support and encouragement through this
trying process and law school.
See, e.g., Daniel G. Worthington & Mark Metric, Which Trust Situs is Best in 2018?, 157
Tr. & Est. 73, 73 (2018).The location in which the trust maintains its situs is important to the
creation of a trust, as it dictates the applicable state tax, the allowable trust structure, and the trustee’s
powers under that situs’s law. See, e.g., Peggy K. Gardner & Morgan Wiener, Is the Irrevocable Trust
Really Irrevocable, 47 Colo. Law. 56, 57 (2018). See also Cheyenne Frontier Days, https://www.
cfdrodeo.com/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2018).
1
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With its modern trust laws, no state income tax, and accessibility to private
trust companies, Wyoming is a trust-friendly jurisdiction.2 It is not sufficient for
trustees simply to recognize Wyoming is a “dominant trust situs jurisdiction,”
however, as utilizing Wyoming’s trust laws requires knowledge of how to transfer
a trust’s situs to Wyoming and how to navigate Wyoming’s trust laws, both on a
statutory and common law level, upon arrival.3 For revocable trusts, transferring
the trust to Wyoming from another situs requires a simple modification but, for
irrevocable trusts, such a transfer requires an evaluation of the allowances of the
trust.4 If allowed by the trust terms, changing the situs requires effectuation of the
term.5 Difficulty arises for trustees when the terms of the trust do not expressly
allow such a move, as the trustee requires some authority to change a trust’s situs.6
Such authority, if it exists, is located in statute or common law—one option being
the law of decanting.7 Decanting provides trustees increased flexibility to manage
a trust, and Wyoming law offers both decanting and advanced estate planning
techniques to best achieve a settlor’s goals.8
This Comment discusses the express mechanics of decanting in Wyoming as
well as those states from which Wyoming attorneys’ clients may originate.9 After
understanding how to decant, practitioners must know when decanting may be
2
See Amy M. Staehr, The Discovered Country: Wyoming’s Primacy as a Trust Situs Jurisdic
tion, 18 Wyo. L. Rev. 283, 289 (2018) (summarizing Christopher Reimer, The Undiscovered
Country: Wyoming’s Emergence as a Leading Trust Situs Jurisdiction, 11 Wyo. L. Rev. 165, 172–99
(2011)); David Shaftel et al., Eleventh Annual ACTEC Comparison of the Domestic Asset
Protection Trust Statutes 34–48 (David Shaftel ed., 2017), http://www.shaftellaw.com/docs/
article-38.pdf; Virtual Representation Statutes Chart, Am. Coll. of Tr. & Est. Couns., http://www.
actec.org/assets/1/6/Bart-Virtual-Representation-Statutes-Chart.pdf (last updated Oct. 1, 2018);
Steve Oshins, 5th Annual Dynasty Trust State Rankings Chart, Law Offices of Oshins & Assoc.
(Apr. 2016), http://bridgefordtrust.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Dynasty_Trust_Rankings.
pdf; Steve Oshins, 8th Annual Domestic Asset Protecting Trust State Rankings Chart, Law Offices of
Oshins & Assoc. (Apr. 2017), https://www.nevadatrust.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/8th_
annual_domestic_asset_protection_trust_state_rankings_chart.pdf; Joseph E. McDonald, III,
Emerging Directed Trust Company Model, 151 Tr. & Est. 49, 50 (2012).
3

Staehr, supra note 2, at 288.

James S. Sligar, Changing Trust Situs: The Legal Considerations of “Forum Shopping,” 135 Tr.
& Est. 40, 41 (July 1996).
4

5

Id.

Al W. King, Tips from the Pros: Decanting is a Popular Strategy, but Don’t Ignore Several Key
Considerations, 157 Tr. & Est. 14, 15 (2018). Certainly, a situation may arise where neither the
trust document, the statute, nor the common law provide authority for a decanting, but this may not
preclude transfer of the trust situs. Id. Estate planning strategies may still allow a trustee to change
a situs, such as through appointment of a co-trustee in a jurisdiction allowing trustee decanting. Id.
However, such a discussion is outside the scope of this Comment. For further information on these
estate planning techniques, see id.
6

Id. Decanting is only one option to change a situs, however, as state statutes may also
provide a means to change a trust’s situs. See, e.g., Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 4-10-108(c) (2019).
7

8

See infra notes 96–109, 183–293 and accompanying text.

9

See infra notes 57–176 and accompanying text.
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advantageous for their clients’ assets.10 Part II of this Comment offers a step-bystep guide to decanting in California, Colorado, Massachusetts, New York, South
Dakota, and Wyoming.11 Upon the conclusion of the guide to decanting, Part II
provides a chart comparing the discussed states.12 Part III describes certain trust
types into which a trustee should consider decanting and the tax consequences
of that decanting.13 Finally, Part IV discusses potential fiduciary obligations
prompted by decanting.14

II. Background
Decanting is an emerging estate planning technique which allows trustees
greater latitude to accomplish their fiduciary duties.15 This planning technique is
analogous to pouring wine into a decanter to remove troublesome elements of the
wine.16 Removing these imperfections requires pouring the wine from its original
container (the wine bottle) into a secondary container (the decanter).17 As applied
to trusts, decanting allows a trustee to assign all or part of the trust corpus from
one trust to a secondary trust.18 Decanting “allows a trustee (or other empowered
party), without court permission or involvement, to abandon or modify
problematic provisions of an existing trust by ‘decanting’ or pouring out some
or all of the contents of that trust into a new trust with the desired provisions.”19

10

See infra notes 183–321 and accompanying text.

See infra notes 57–176 and accompanying text. This Comment focuses on these states
because they are those in which Wyoming practitioners may practice due to their licensure or
because clients from those states changed their residency to Wyoming.
11

12

See infra notes 177– 82 and accompanying text.

13

See infra notes 183 –321 and accompanying text.

14

See infra notes 322–36 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., Staehr, supra note 2, at 300; Mary Akkerman, Decanting: A Practical Roadmap
for Modernizing Trusts in South Dakota, 61 S.D. L. Rev. 413, 417 (2016). Generally, “[d]ecanting
statutes rest on the premise that a trustee with absolute discretion to invade principal is the functional
equivalent of the holder of a nongeneral power” of appointment. Stewart E. Sterk, Trust Decanting:
A Critical Perspective, 38 Cardozo L. Rev. 1993, 2002 (2017). Such powers of appointment are
nongeneral, as the trust terms limit the holder of a power to appoint trust corpus or income. Id. For
example, a settlor can give her husband a nongeneral power of appointment over a trust established
for the benefit of their children, allowing the husband to appoint the trust corpus or income to their
children in any proportion he so chooses. See id. While the spouse can appoint in any proportion,
the spouse may exercise that power in favor of the children. See id.
15

16
Jonathan G. Blattmachr et al., An Analysis of the Tax Effects of Decanting, 47 Real Prop. Tr.
& Est. L.J. 141, 142 (2012).

See, e.g., Alexander Bove, Jr., Another Look at Trust Decanting, 24 Trs. & Trustees 338,
338 (2018).
17

18

Id.

19

Id.
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The power to modify a trust without court involvement allows trustees to save on
court costs and delay, which improves trustees’ ability to manage their trusts.20
For example, In re Estate of Pulitzer provides a potential fact pattern where
decanting would have been beneficial to save the trustees time and money when
simply attempting to generate trust income.21 Pulitzer involved an irrevocable
trust, created in the early 1900s, forbidding the trustees from selling its shares
of the Press Publishing Company.22 Those shares comprised a significant portion
of the trust’s corpus.23 While the share price was initially stable, losses started
occurring in an average amount of nearly $500,000 annually.24 This situation—
where the trust corpus loses value drastically and the trust prohibits the trustees
from selling the capital stock—is a classic example of changed circumstances: the
settlor in Pulitzer believed the stock would increase in value to garner income for
the benefit of his children, but instead, the stock lost value, threatening the very
existence of the trust.25
When confronting changed circumstances, trustees typically must seek
modification from a court to amend the trust so the settlor’s purpose can be
accomplished.26 For charitable trusts, trustees must seek court approval to apply
the Cy Pres doctrine, which allows for modification of a trust’s purpose if the
original purpose becomes illegal, impossible, or impracticable.27 Likewise, for
non-charitable trusts, trustees must seek court approval to apply the equitable
deviation doctrine, allowing a trustee to “deviate from the administrative terms of
a trust . . . if compliance would defeat or substantially impair the accomplishment

20
See generally Jesse Dukeminier & Robert H. Sitkoff, Wills, Trusts, And Estates 444
(10th ed. 2017); see also John H. Martin, Reconfiguring Estate Settlement, 94 Minn. L. Rev. 42, 49
(2009) (“Delay, expense, and lack of privacy are three universal criticisms of probate.”); Joel C.
Dobris et al., Estates and Trusts, Cases and Materials 46 (2d ed. 2002) (“Many testators seek to
avoid the probate process because of its reputation—sometimes but not always deserved—for delay
and expense.”); William M. McGovern, Jr. & Sheldon F. Kurtz, Wills, Trusts and Estates 469
(2d ed. 2001) (“Administration is needless expense.”).
21

In re Pulitzer’s Estate, 139 Misc. 575, 577, 249 N.Y.S. 87 (Sur. Ct. 1931).

22

Id. at 577, 582.

Id. It is possible that the capital stock in the Press Publishing Company comprised the
entire trust corpus, but it is ultimately unclear from the court’s opinion. See id. at 578.
23

Id. at 582, 583. Calculated for inflation, the annual losses were approximately
$10,870,729.90. See US Inflation Calculator, CoinNews, https://www.usinflationcalculator.
com (last visited Apr. 6, 2019).
24

25

See, e.g., In re Estate of Pulitzer, 139 Misc. at 575.

26

Dukeminier & Sitkoff, supra note 20, at 743.

See generally Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 539, 589–90 (1867). A charitable
trust is a trust created when the settlor manifests an intent to create a trust for charity and holding
the trustee “to equitable duties to deal with the property for a charitable purpose.” Restatement
(Second) of Trusts § 348 (Am. Law Inst. 1959). For further information on the Cy Pres doctrine,
see Edith L. Fisch, Cy Pres Doctrine and Changing Philosophies, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 375 (1953).
27
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of the purposes of the trust in light of changed circumstances not anticipated
by the settlor.”28 While these doctrines require court involvement, the decanting
power, if available to trustees, does not.29
As Pulitzer pre-dated any statutory or common law authority to decant,
only a court could provide recourse to the Pulitzer trustees.30 The Pulitzer court
recognized the inequities of enforcing the trust’s prohibition-on-sale provision,
so it applied equitable deviation to grant the trustees the “general power and
authority to act in the conveyance of the [securities].”31 Today, with the possibility
of decanting, trustees have another option: without seeking court approval,
trustees may decant to remove the troublesome provision and, if they so wish,
amend the trust to add other beneficial terms, such as a provision crafted by the
Uniform Prudent Investor Act.32 While this example pertains only to decanting
away an individual provision, decanting may also be used to completely vacate the
original trust in favor of a second trust.33
While decanting offers trustees increased freedom to maintain trust corpus,
the breadth of that freedom is defined by common law, state statutes, the
Restatements, and Uniform Law Commission provisions.34 In 1940, Florida
became the first jurisdiction to allow decanting through its common law in Phipps
v. Palm Beach Trust Co.35 In 1932, Margarita Phipps established a trust for her
three children, one of whom (John H. Phipps) was the primary beneficiary.36
Margarita’s husband, an individual trustee (John S. Phipps), and a corporate
trustee (the Palm Beach Trust Company) served as co-trustees.37 Notably, the trust
granted to the individual trustee the “absolute power to administer a trust estate in
the interest of designated beneficiaries.”38 On July 25, 1939, the individual trustee

28

Dukeminier & Sitkoff, supra note 20, at 734.

29

Sterk, supra note 15, at 1995.

30

Pulitzer, 139 Misc. at 583.

31

Id.

See generally Unif. Prudent Inv’r Act (Unif. Law. Comm’n 1995). The Uniform Prudent
Investors Act (UPIA) is just one example of the provisions that could be added. The UPIA would
have been advantageous for the trustees in Pulitzer because it grants trustees the ability to sell trust
assets to diversify and protect the trust corpus. See id. § 2.
32

Robert Sitkoff, The Rise of Trust Decanting in the United States, 23 Trs. & Trustees 976,
976 (2017).
33

34

Id.

Phipps v. Palm Beach Tr. Co., 196 So. 299, 301 (Fla. 1940) (recognizing “the power of the
individual trustee to create [a] second trust provided one or more of the descendants of the donor
of the original trust are made the beneficiaries”). Id.
35

36

Id. at 300.

37

Id.

38

Id. at 301.
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acted pursuant to that provision, notifying the corporate trustee to appoint the
entirety of the corpus to a second trust.39 Upon receipt, the corporate trustee
asked the court to determine whether this was a correct exercise of the individual
trustee’s power.40 The court articulated the following rule: “the power vested in
a trustee to create an estate in fee includes the power to create or appoint any
estate less than a fee unless the donor clearly indicates a contrary intent.”41 This
rule, as applied to the Phipps trust, meant the individual trustee had the power
to appoint any amount of funds in further trust.42
Fifty-two years later, in 1992, New York became the first state to codify a
trustee’s decanting power.43 This law recognized the supremacy of the “terms
of the instrument.”44 If the trustee had “absolute discretion . . . to invade the
principal of a trust” for the benefit of beneficiaries, then New York trustees had
unilateral power under the statute to appoint “so much or all” of the trust corpus
in further trust.45 Additionally, the trustee could petition a court with jurisdiction
to direct the trustee to decant.46 Whether occurring unilaterally or through a court,
decanting had to maintain “any fixed income interest” of any beneficiaries;47 had
to be in favor of the trust beneficiaries;48 could not violate other typical fiduciary
duties;49 and could not be used to increase trustee commissions.50 Finally, the
statute required the decanting to be filed in writing with the court in the trust’s
situs, signed and acknowledged by the trustee, and, if the trustee sought to decant
unilaterally, signed “by all the persons interested in the trust.”51 Following the

39

Id. at 300.

40

Id. at 301.

41

Id.

42

Id.

See Act of July 24, 1992 ch. 591, 1992 N.Y. Laws 3520, 3521 (codified as amended at
N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 10-6.6(b) (Consol. 2019)). See also infra notes 44–51 and
accompanying text (discussing the requirements in New York as they were in 1992). These
requirements have since changed. See infra notes 143– 60 and accompanying text.
43

44

N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 10-6.6(b); 1992 N.Y. Laws 3521.

45

N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 10-6.6(b)(1); 1992 N.Y. Laws 3521.

46

N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 10-6.6(b)(2); 1992 N.Y. Laws 3521.

47

N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 10-6.6(b)(1)(A), (b)(2)(A); 1992 N.Y. Laws 3521.

48

N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 10-6.6(b)(1)(B), (b)(2)(B); 1992 N.Y. Laws 3521.

N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 10-6.6(b)(1)(C), (b)(2)(C); 1992 N.Y. Laws 3521; see
also Act of Apr. 27, 1967, ch. 686, 1967 N.Y. Laws 1711, 1740 (codified as amended at N.Y. Est.
Powers & Trusts Law § 11-1.7 (Consol. 2019)).
49

50

N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 10-6.6(c); 1992 N.Y. Laws 3521.

N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 10-6.6(d); 1992 N.Y. Laws 3521. The phrase “all
persons interested in the trust” is defined as “upon whom service of process would be required in a
proceeding for the judicial settlement of the account of the trustee.” N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts
Law § 10-6.6(e); 1992 N.Y. Laws 3521.
51
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enactment of New York’s statute, several states followed suit allowing trustees to
decant with varying discretion.52
As the frequency of common law decisions and state statutes increased,
the American Law Institute (ALI) and the Uniform Law Commission (ULC)
promulgated decanting proposals.53 Originally published on May 12, 1998,
the ALI’s Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers
recognized the decanting power.54 The ULC published its Uniform Trust
Decanting Act (UTDA) in 2015.55 Finally, in 2018, the ULC amended its
Uniform Trust Code (UTC) recognizing the opportunity for state legislatures to
permit decanting through changes in the already-adopted UTC.56

III. How to Decant
A. Massachusetts: A Common Law Example
At the time of writing this Comment, twenty-eight states have decanting
statutes in some form.57 Of the states discussed in this Comment, only
Massachusetts has not adopted a decanting statute, but still permits decanting
through state common law.58 Massachusetts’s caselaw on decanting began with
Loring v. Karri-Davies, where the Supreme Judicial Court held “a donee of a
special power of appointment may distribute assets in further trust on behalf
of the objects of the special power, provided the donor manifest[s] no intent to
the contrary.”59 The decision did not concern decanting in name; rather, Loring
analyzed a donee’s exercise of her power of appointment in further trust to the
benefit of the beneficiaries.60 While this Comment does not attempt to discuss

52

See infra notes 177–82 and accompanying text.

See Unif. Trust Decanting Act prefatory note (Unif. Law Comm’n 2018), available at
https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFile
Key=d1bed9bb-7882-6b4a-2c23-916d4b28536d&forceDialog=0.
53

See Restatement (Third)
cmt. f (Am. Law Inst. 2011).
54

55

of

Property: Wills & Other Donative Transfers § 19.14

See Unif. Trust Decanting Act, supra note 53.

Unif. Trust Code (Unif. Law Comm’n 2018) “[T]erms of the trust . . . may change over
time . . . in accordance with applicable law.” Id. § 103(18).
56

57
M. Patricia Culler, Hahn, Loeser & Parks LLP, State Decanting Statutes Passed or Proposed,
Am. C. Tr. & Est. Couns. (ACTEC) (Aug. 20, 2018), https://www.actec.org/assets/1/6/CullerDecanting-Statutes-Passed-or-Proposed.pdf; see also Ala. Code §§ 19-3D-1 to -29 (2019).
58

See Culler, supra note 57; see also Morse v. Kraft, 992 N.E.2d 1021 (Mass. 2013).

59

Loring v. Karri-Davies, 357 N.E.2d 11, 14 (Mass. 1976); Morse, 992 N.E.2d at 1025.

60

Loring, 357 N.E.2d at 14.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2019

7

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 19 [2019], No. 2, Art. 7

334

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 19

such a power, Loring informs the legal background of Massachusetts’ allowance of
the decanting power in Morse v. Kraft.61
On January 4, 1982, Robert and Myra Kraft established a trust (First
Trust) including four separate “subtrusts” for the benefit of their four children
individually.62 The First Trust required a trustee be “disinterested,” excluding
the children from ever becoming trustees of their respective subtrusts.63 Richard
Morse, serving as sole trustee of the First Trust and the four subtrusts from the
outset, sought “to transfer all of the property of the subtrusts into [new] trusts”
(Second Trust).64 These new subtrusts included one significant departure from
the First Trust framework: the children could serve as “trustees with distributive
power” of their respective subtrusts.65 Morse argued this transfer, one interpreted
as decanting by the court, served the best interests of the beneficiaries.66
Perhaps unsurprisingly, tax law guided the court to the issue.67 Specifically,
Morse requested declaratory relief to determine whether his proposed transfer
would trigger the Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax (GST), an inquiry requiring
the court to determine “whether ‘[t]he terms of [the First Trust] authorize[d]
distributions to [the Second Trust] . . . without the consent or approval of any
beneficiary or court.’”68 Relying on Loring, the Morse court distinguished between
Loring’s application to donees and trustees.69 Unlike the general power read into
a “donor manifest”—allowing a donee of a special power of appointment to
exercise that power in further trust—the court was unwilling to adopt a similar
rule reading-in the decanting power for trustees.70 Instead, the court looked to
the terms of the trust, articulating that “it is nevertheless clear that a trustee’s
decanting authority ‘turn[s] on the facts of the particular case and the terms of
the instrument creating the trust.’”71 Determining the trust generally granted the

61

Id.; Morse, 992 N.E.2d at 1025–26.

62

Morse, 992 N.E.2d at 1022–23.

Id. at 1023. The sons were disallowed because, “at the time of [the First Trust’s] creation,
the sons were minors and it was impossible to know whether they would develop the skills and
judgment necessary to make distribution decisions concerning their respective subtrusts.” Id.
63

64

Id.

65

Id.

Id. The decanting was in the best interest of the beneficiaries because Morse believed each
beneficiary was mature enough to manage his respective subtrust. Id.
66

67

Id. at 1023–24.

Id. at 1022, 1024 (quoting Treas. Reg. § 26.2601-1(b)(4)(i)(A)(1)(i) (2019) (as amended
in 2004)).
68

69

Id. at 1025.

70

Id. at 1027.

71

Id. at 1025 (quoting Phipps v. Palm Beach Tr. Co., 196 So. 299, 301 (Fla. 1940)).
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trustee complete power to benefit the beneficiaries without court involvement,
the court held that the terms of the First Trust authorized decanting.72 While this
signaled to Massachusetts trustees that decanting would be allowed, it left open
the important question of whether decanting was permissible when the first trust
is silent on the decanting power.73
Unlike the Morse trustee who sought court permission to decant, the trustees
in Ferri v. Powell-Ferri decanted without court approval, and then sought a
retroactive declaration that the past decanting was lawful.74 There, the settlor,
Paul J. Ferri, Sr., established a trust for the benefit of his son, Paul J. Ferri, Jr., in
1983 (1983 Trust).75 Ferri, Jr. married in 1995, but after his wife Powell-Ferri’s
2010 filing to dissolve the marriage, the uninterested trustees decanted to a new
trust without court approval (2011 Trust).76 In particular, the trustees decanted
“out of concern that Powell-Ferri would reach the assets of the 1983 Trust as a
result of the divorce action” and neither informed nor sought the consent of Ferri,
Jr.77 To address this concern, the 2011 Trust included a spendthrift provision.78
After decanting, the trustees sought a declaratory judgment against Ferri, Jr. and
Powell-Ferri, and asked the court to validate the decanting to protect the 2011
trust assets from any claims which may have been made by Powell-Ferri.79
The court held the transfer valid after applying the analysis in Morse.80
The court found that the 1983 Trust granted the trustees “extremely broad
discretion” to administer the trust, evidencing the settlor’s intent to allow
decanting.81 Although Powell-Ferri argued the trustees’ discretion was limited
when Ferri, Jr.’s right to compel distributions of corpus vested, the court found
the trustees had a fiduciary duty to protect trust assets that did not end until
trust corpus was depleted.82 The court read harmoniously the terms of the 1983

72

Id. at 1025 (quoting the terms of the First Trust), 1026, 1028.

73

Id. at 1027.

Ferri v. Powell-Ferri, 72 N.E.3d 541, 543 (Mass. 2017); see also Marc J. Bloostein, Case
Focus: Ferri v. Powell-Fern: Expansion of Common Law “Trust Decanting” in Massachusetts, 61 Bos.
B.J., no. 3, 2017, at 39.
74

75

Ferri, 72 N.E.3d at 544.

76

Id.

77

Id.

Id. A spendthrift provision grants trustees complete control over the distributions of the
corpus and eliminates the beneficiary’s right to compel distribution. Id. For further information on
spendthrift trusts, see George G. Bogert et al., The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 222, Westlaw
(database updated June 2018).
78

79

Ferri, 72 N.E.3d at 544.

80

Id. at 546 –50.

81

Id. at 546.

82

Id. at 550.
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Trust—namely, the broad trustee discretion and an anti-alienation clause—as
evidence of the settlor’s intent to protect the entirety of the trust’s assets until the
trust terminated.83 The court’s holding, however, left open a question as to the
extent to which the fiduciary duty applies.84
In rearticulating the intent of the settlor, the court enunciated a fiduciary
“duty to decant.”85 Unfortunately for Massachusetts trustees, however, the court
simply stated this duty “without explaining.”86 Although the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts, the Boston Bar Association, and local attorneys have
requested that Massachusetts’s courts and state legislature adopt formal decanting
rules, this request has gone unanswered.87 Regardless, advisors armed with Morse
and Ferri indicate a “trend of trustees decanting to discretionary trusts without
any term for asset protection purposes.”88

B. Statutory Schema Permitting Trust Decanting
While states vary in their statutory approach to decanting, state statutes
typically fall into three categories: UTC states,89 UTDA states,90 and states with
other statutory methods of decanting.91

1. The Uniform Trust Code: Wyoming’s Approach to Decanting
Through a combination of general trust, tax, and decanting laws, Wyoming
is on the threshold of becoming—if it has not already become—the pinnacle
of trust situses in the United States because it provides maximum planning

83

Id.

84

Id.

Id. (“[U]nless and until all of the trust assets were distributed in response to the beneficiary’s
request for a withdrawal, the trustee could exercise his or her powers and obligations under the
1983 Trust, including the duty to decant if the trustee deemed decanting to be in the beneficiary’s
best interest.”).
85

Bloostein, supra note 74, at 40. For a further discussion on the duty to decant, see infra
notes 322–36 and accompanying text.
86

Ferri, 72 N.E.3d at 554; Kristin T. Abati & Renat V. Lumpau, Common-Law Decanting
of Trusts: Lessons From Massachusetts, 44 Est. Plan. J. 3, 7 (Oct. 2017); Brief of the Boston Bar
Association, Amicus Curiae at 3, Morse v. Kraft, 992 N.E.2d 1021 (Mass. 2013) (SJC-11233),
http://www.bostonbar.org/docs/default-document-library/morse-v-kraft-amicus.pdf; see also, e.g.,
Bloostein, supra note 74, at 40 (“The Massachusetts legislature should adopt a decanting statute to
provide a path for trustees to decant with clear limits and safeguards.”).
87

88

King, supra note 6, at 16.

89

See infra notes 96 –104 and accompanying text.

90

See infra notes 105 –27 and accompanying text.

91

See infra notes 128–76 and accompanying text.
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flexibility.92 Although most jurisdictions that permit decanting do so through
statute, Wyoming’s statute differs by allowing trustees to exercise unparalleled
discretion to react to changing trust circumstances.93 This breadth of power
suggests trustees administering trusts outside of Wyoming should transfer the
trust situs to Wyoming to take advantage of its favorable laws.94 Transferring a
situs may be simple if the trust document allows such a transfer, but, if it does
not, decanting provides the means through which the trust can be moved
to Wyoming.95
Initially, the Uniform Trustees’ Powers Act (UTPA) governed the scope of
trustee powers, but, in 2003, the Wyoming State Legislature (Legislature) repealed
the UTPA and adopted the UTC.96 In Wyoming, § 4-10-816 defines the scope
of trustee powers.97 The UTC did not, however, initially include a decanting
provision, relegating Wyoming trustees to the common law for decanting
support.98 But, beginning in 2005, the Legislature began creating the decanting
power although, notably, that power is not expressly named decanting.99
In 2005, the Legislature enacted the first of several amendments to § 4-10816.100 Next, in 2013, the Legislature amended § 4-10-816 to include decanting
as a trustee power if the trust granted the trustee the power “to make discretionary
distributions.”101 In 2015, the Legislature amended § 4-10-816 to further restrict

92
Reimer, supra note 2, at 166– 67. “[T]hese factors make[] Wyoming an ideal jurisdiction in
which to create, migrate, or reform a trust.” Id. at 200.

See Culler, supra note 57; Staehr, supra note 2, at 302 (stating that Wyoming is one of
the only states to allow decanting when trustees have only a mandatory distribution power, and
Wyoming also permits trustees to decant without providing notice).
93

94

See infra notes 96–104 and accompanying text.

95

See generally King, supra note 6, at 15.

See §§ 4-10-101 to -103, Act of Mar. 4, 2003 ch. 124, 2003 Wyo. Sess. Laws 304, 305.
The Legislature repealed the UTPA in favor of updates to the UTC. Wyo. Legislative Serv. Office,
H.B. 77 Digest, 57th Leg., Budget Sess., Wyo. Leg. (2014), https://www.wyoleg.gov/2003/Digest/
HB0077.htm.
96

2003 Wyo. Sess. Laws at 336 –38 (codified as amended at Wyo. Stat. Ann.
§ 4-10-816 (2019)).
97

98
See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 4-10-816 (2013); Reimer, supra note 2, at 185. Although no
Wyoming case expressly permits decanting, the Wyoming Supreme Court in Garwood v. Garwood
granted broad discretion for trustees to modify trusts under common law. Garwood v. Garwood
2008 WY 129, ¶ 21, 194 P.3d 319, 327 (Wyo. 2008). “[I]f the common law can be used to modify
a trust, it is arguable that it may also be used to decant a trust.” Reimer, supra note 2, at 185 n.124.
99
See Act of Feb. 25, 2005, ch. 126, sec. 2, 2005 Wyo. Sess. Laws 291, 297 (codified
as amended at Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 4-10-816(a)(xxvii), (b) (2019)); infra notes 100– 04 and
accompanying text.
100

2005 Wyo. Sess. Laws at 297 (codified at Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 4-10-816(b) (2019)).

Act of Mar. 13, ch. 178, sec. 2, 2013 Wyo. Sess. Laws 449, 455–57 (codified as amended
at Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 4-10-816 (2019)). As of 2013, it appears as though the decanting power
101
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the decanting power in two key respects: (1) prohibiting the exercise “in any
manner that would prevent qualification for a federal estate or gift tax marital
deduction, federal estate or gift tax charitable deduction, or other federal income,
estate, gift or generation-skipping transfer tax”; and (2) shielding trustees from
liability if decanting was in good faith.102 Finally, in 2017, the Legislature
amended § 4-10-816 to extend the decanting power to trustees endowed with
the power to make “discretionary or mandatory distributions,” but preventing
trustees who are also beneficiaries from increasing their interest as a beneficiary
by decanting.103 The result of all four amendments is an “unparalleled breadth of
decanting powers available to a Wyoming trustee” under § 4-10-816.104

2. The Uniform Trust Decanting Act: Colorado and California
In 2016, Colorado adopted the UTDA, which applies to all trusts created
“before, on, or after August 10, 2016.”105 Under the UTDA, trustees may decant
irrevocable and revocable trusts, but the UTDA does not apply to revocable
trusts unless the settlor may only revoke with consent of either the trustees or
an adverse interest holder.106 Trustees may not decant trusts “held solely for
charitable purposes,” nor may trustees decant if the trust’s terms expressly prohibit
decanting.107 If the trust does not expressly prohibit decanting, the decanting
power is “deemed to be included” in all trusts subject to a trustee’s fiduciary
duties.108 Colorado trustees have no duty to decant as the statute specifically
excludes an affirmative duty to decant from general fiduciary duties.109

applied only to trustees with a discretionary power, excluding trustees from administering trusts
with mandatory distribution provisions. See id.; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 4-10-816.
102
Act of Mar. 2, 2015, ch. 88, sec. 2, 2015 Wyo. Sess. Laws 294, 295–96 (codified as
amended at Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 4-10-816(b) (2019)).

Act of Feb. 17, 2017, ch. 37, sec. 1, 2017 Wyo. Sess. Laws 69, 69 (codified as amended at
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 4-10-816(a)(xxviii), (b) (2019)).
103

104

Staehr, supra note 2, at 340.

Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15-16-905 (2018). California recently adopted the UTDA in
a very similar manner to Colorado, but with some differences. Compare Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§§ 15-16-906, -924, -929 (protecting trustees’ reasonably relying upon the validity of distributions;
specifying the second trust falls under the Colorado statute’s authority; and clarifying the Colorado
UTDA modifies, limits, or supersedes a federal electronic signatures act, respectively), with Cal.
Prob. Code § 19529 (West 2019) (clarifying that the California UTDA does not limit trustees’
ability to petition a court for instructions).
105

Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 15-16-905(1), -903(1). While this Comment specifically dis
cusses trustees, any “authorized fiduciary” may decant. Id. § 15-16-902(3).
106

Id. §§ 15-16-903(2), -903(3). A charitable purpose is one such as, for example, assisting
the poor. For more information on charitable purposes, see “Charitable” Purposes, I.R.S., https://
www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/charitable-purposes (last visited Apr. 18, 2019).
107

108

Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15-16-904(2), (1).

109

Id. § 15-16-904(2).
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If the trust meets these prerequisites, Colorado trustees must next determine
whether the trust grants “limited” or “expanded” distributive discretion.110
If the distribution power is limited by an ascertainable or reasonably definite
standard, then the trustee’s power is a “limited” power.111 If limited, decanting is
permissible, but beneficiaries of the original trust must be granted “substantially
similar” interests in the second trust.112 Conversely, if the distribution power is not
limited by such standards, then the trustee’s power is an “expanded” power.113 If
expanded, the second trust must not include new beneficiaries, new “presumptive
remainder beneficiar[ies] or successor beneficiar[ies],” nor “reduce or eliminate
a vested interest.”114 The second trust may, subject to these limitations, retain
or omit a power of appointment, create or amend a power of appointment if
the powerholder is a current beneficiary or “a presumptive remainder beneficiary
or successor beneficiary” of the original trust, or both.115 Whether limited or
expanded, the decanting power may be exercised to the extent the original trust
provides “distributive discretion over part but not all of the principal.”116
Finally, after determining whether the trustee’s power is limited or expanded,
the Colorado trustee must adhere to all other statutory rules.117 First, the trustee
must determine whether to modify the existing trust or transfer it into a new
trust, and draft the trust document accordingly.118 Second, the trustee must
provide notice to the necessary parties: the settlor, every qualified beneficiary and
holder of a presently exercisable power of appointment of the original trust, every
person with the right to remove or replace the trustee, and each fiduciary of both
the original and the second trust.119 Unless waived by all parties, the trustee must
110
Id. §§ 15-16-911, -912; Jessica L. Broderick, Modifying Irrevocable Trusts Under the New
Colorado Uniform Trust Decanting Act, 45 Colo. Law. 55, 56 (Nov. 2016).

Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15-16-912(1). A reasonably definite standard would be one
for health, education, maintenance, and support. Treas. Reg. § 1.674(b)-1(b)(5)(i) (2019). For
more information on reasonably definite standards, see Philip M. Lindquist, Drafting Defective
Grantor Trusts 12 (July 11, 2012), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/real_
property_trust_estate/step/2012/materials/rpte_step_2012_07_11_Lindquist_Grantor_Trusts_
The_Basics_Speech_Outline.pdf.
111

112

Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15-16-912(3).

113

Id. § 15-16-911.

114

Id. § 15-16-911(3).

Id. § 15-16-911(4). What cannot be retained or omitted are “presently exercisable general
power[s]” of appointment. Id.
115

116
Id. §§ 15-16-911(6), -912(5). For further discussion on limited and expanded distributive
discretions, see Broderick, supra note 110, at 56–57.
117

Broderick, supra note 110, at 57.

118

Id.

Id.; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15-16-907(3)(a)–(h). If the trust is a charitable trust,
the Attorney General must be notified as well. Id. § 15-16-907(3)(g). Additionally, if the trust’s
beneficiaries include minors, incapacitated persons, unborn individuals, or unknown or unreachable
persons, a representative may need to be notified. Id. § 15-16-908.
119
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wait sixty-three days after notice is given before decanting.120 At the conclusion of
this period, the trustee may decant in a document adhering to the formalities.121
Additionally, while not required, a trustee may petition the court to declare the
decanting a lawful exercise of the trustee’s powers.122
On January 1, 2019, California adopted the Uniform Trust Decanting Act
(CUTDA) and, although very similar, there are three notable differences between
the UTDA and the CUTDA.123 First, the CUTDA requires California trustees
to give notice to minors and unascertained or unborn beneficiaries unless the
trust document provides otherwise.124 Second, the CUTDA compels trustees to
include specific language—in bold—describing a beneficiary’s decanting right.125
Third, while California still restricts trustees from decanting in a manner that
increases their compensation, the CUTDA clarifies the situations in which the
restriction applies.126 In all other respects, the CUTDA adheres to the standard
UTDA provisions described above.127

C. Other Statutory Methods of Decanting
1. South Dakota
South Dakota adopted its decanting statute in 2007.128 Providing substantial
flexibility to trustees, South Dakota’s decanting law is best understood through a
discussion of its limitations.129 Prior to decanting, a trustee must first determine

120

Id. § 15-16-907(6), (3).

121

Id. § 15-16-910.

122

Broderick, supra note 110, at 58; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15-16-909.

Cal. Prob. Code §§ 19501–19530 (Deering 2019). For facial differences between the
Colorado and California UTDAs, compare Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 15-16-906, -924, -929, with
Cal. Prob. Code § 19529; 3 John A. Hartog & Albert G. Handelman, California Wills &
Trusts § 114.11[2] (Matthew Bender, ed. 2019).
123

124

Hartog & Handelman, supra note 123, § 114.11[2]; Cal. Prob. Code § 19507(d).

125

Hartog & Handelman, supra note 123, § 114.11[2]; Cal. Prob. Code § 19507(g)(5).

126

Hartog & Handelman, supra note 123, § 114.11[2]; Cal. Prob. Code § 19516(a), (b), (c).

Compare supra notes 123–26 and accompanying text, with supra notes 110–22 and
accompanying text.
127

Thomas E. Simmons, Decanting and its Alternatives: Remodeling and Revamping Irrevocable
Trusts, 55 S.D. L. Rev. 253, 263 (2010). See also S.D. Codified Laws § 55-2-15 (2019). The South
Dakota statute was “seemingly modeled after Delaware’s decanting statutes.” Simmons supra.
128

Al W. King, III & Pierce H. McDowell, III, A Bellwether of Modern Trust Concepts: A
Historical Review of South Dakota’s Powerful Trust Laws, 62 S.D. L. Rev. 266, 266 (2017); see also
Al W. King, III, S.D. Trust Co., Are Irrevocable Trusts Truly Irrevocable? Reformation,
Modification, Decanting and Trust Protectors, Address at the Berks County Estate
Planning Council (Mar. 16, 2016), available at http://www.berkscountyepc.org/assets/Councils/
BerksCountyEPC-PA/library/00119813.PDF.
129
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whether the trust at issue is a testamentary, irrevocable, or revocable trust.130 If
the trust is either testamentary or irrevocable, decanting is permitted.131 Trustees
must then determine whether decanting is justified under the circumstances
after considering the original trust’s purpose, the second trust’s terms, and any
consequences of decanting.132
If the trust may be decanted and the trustee determines that decanting is
justified under the circumstances, a trustee is permitted to decant subject to
limitations on the form of the second trust.133 The second trust cannot include
any beneficiaries whom the original trust’s trustees could not have exercised
their power, either currently or upon a specified future event.134 If trustees are
beneficiaries “of the first trust or if a beneficiary of the first trust has a power
to change the trustees,” then the trustee is termed a “restricted trustee.”135 If
trustees are restricted, the decanting may not result in a benefit to the trustee as
a beneficiary, nor may it remove “restrictions on discretionary distributions to a
beneficiary” unless limited by “an ascertainable standard based on or related to
health, education, maintenance, or support.”136 Additionally, a restricted trustee
may not decant if doing so increases distributions made from the second trust
to either a restricted trustee or a beneficiary with the power to change trustees,
unless limited by the same ascertainable standard.137 Although legislative history
on the issue is slim, it is undoubtable that the purpose of these limitations is to
prevent trustees from abusing the decanting power for their benefit, either directly
through an increased interest in the trust or by removing a beneficiary’s power to
force their removal.138
Regardless of whether they are restricted, trustees may not increase the vesting
time of a beneficiary’s remainder interest in the case of contributions treated as
gifts.139 They also may not reduce an income-beneficiary’s interest if the trust is
used for a marital deduction under federal tax law, a charitable remainder trust,

130

Akkerman, supra note 15, at 418; see also S.D. Codified Laws § 55-2-15.

131

Akkerman, supra note 15, at 418; see also S.D. Codified Laws § 55-2-15.

S.D. Codified Laws § 55-2-15. While the statute does not define what consequences
must be considered by trustees prior to decanting, the consequences would likely include
losing “grandfathered” status or triggering the generation-skipping transfer tax. See id. See also
generally Thomas F. Committo, IRS Issues Positive Ruling on Trust Decanting, 71 J. Fin. Serv. Prof.
12, 12–15 (2017).
132

133

S.D. Codified Laws § 55-2-15.

134

Id. § 55-2-15(1).

135

Id. § 55-2-15.

136

Id. § 55-2-15(2).

137

Id. § 55-2-15(3).

138

Cf. id. § 55-2-15(2).

139

Id. § 55-2-15(4); I.R.C. § 2503 (2019).
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or a grantor retained annuity or unitrust.140 If property under the original trust
is subject to a presently exercisable power of withdrawal, trustees may not decant
such property unless the second trust maintains the beneficiary’s power over the
property.141 Finally, while trustees decanting into a second trust have the option to
notify beneficiaries of their intent to decant, trustees modifying an existing trust
are required to notify beneficiaries.142

2. New York
The settlor of an original trust may increase, limit, or wholly prohibit decanting through the trust’s terms.143 New York’s statute can be broken into three
categories: (1) rules affecting only trustees with “unlimited discretion”; (2) rules
affecting only trustees “without unlimited discretion”; and (3) rules affecting
both.144 With respect to trustees with unlimited discretion to invade trust
principal (unlimited trustees), the decanting power may be exercised in favor of
any combination of the beneficiaries of the original trust.145 Additionally, when
creating the second trust, unlimited trustees may grant discretionary powers of
appointment to one or more beneficiaries of the original trust.146 This power,
however, is limited as to who may be excluded from the class of the permissible
appointees.147 Finally, if the original trust describes beneficiaries by class, the
second trust may include all “present and future members of such class.”148
Next, New York Estates, Powers and Trusts Law § 10-6.6(c) outlines the
rules affecting trustees without unlimited discretion (limited trustees).149 While
limited trustees may decant, their ability to decant is more limited than unlimited
trustees because they may not add or remove beneficiaries of the second trust
who were not beneficiaries of the original trust in the same manner unlimited

140
S.D. Codified Laws § 55-2-15(6). A unitrust is one where there is no delineation between
income and corpus, directing trustees to distribute a percent of total trust assets to the beneficiaries.
Kenneth W. Bergen, Current Trust Developments: Multiple Trusts/Reformation/Voting Control/
Unitrust, 4 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 182, 187 (1969).
141

S.D. Codified Laws § 55-2-15(7).

142

Akkerman, supra note 15, at 418; see also S.D. Codified Laws §§ 55-2-15, -18.

143

See N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 10-6.6 (Consol. 2019).

Joseph T. La Ferlita, New York’s Newly Amended Decanting Statute Typifies Trend Toward
Greater Flexibility, 26 Prob. & Prop. 34, 36 –37 (2012); N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law
§ 10-6.6(b), (c), (d).
144

145

N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 10-6.6(b).

146

Id. § 10-6.6(b)(1).

Id. § 10-6.6(b)(2)–(3) (including “one or more of the beneficiary, the creator, or the
creator’s spouse, or any of the estates, creditors, or creditors of the estates of the beneficiary, the
creator or the creator’s spouse”).
147

148

Id. § 10-6.6(b)(4).

149

Id. § 10-6.6(c).
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trustees may do so.150 Limited trustees must include the exact language in the
original trust authorizing distribution of income or invasion of principal.151 If the
trust’s term is extended for a period beyond which the original trust would have
terminated, however, the limited trustee may provide unlimited discretion during
the subsequent term.152 Moreover, if the original trust is for the benefit of a class
of beneficiaries, or if it provides a power of appointment to a beneficiary, then the
second trust must include the same beneficiaries and powers of appointment.153
Finally, § 10-6.6(d) through (t) outline the rules impacting unlimited and
limited trustees.154 Generally, if a single trust includes a mix of limited and
unlimited trustees, the unlimited trustees may exercise the decanting power over
the trust notwithstanding the existence of limited trustees.155 The decanting power
may be exercised whether a current need exists under the original trust’s terms.156
To decant, trustees must give notice to all persons with an interest in the trust
in writing or by seeking court approval.157 If trustees give notice, the decanting
becomes effective either thirty days following service or once all persons entitled
to notice consent by writing.158 Prior to decanting, the trustee must determine a
number of things, including whether decanting adheres to her fiduciary duties,
whether decanting is a decision that a “prudent person” would make under “the
prevailing circumstances,” and whether any negative tax implications would
result.159 Ultimately, trustees may not, absent court approval, decant if the second
trust increases the trustee’s compensation.160

3. Florida
Florida’s decanting statute was intended to be an addition to, rather than a
replacement of, the state’s preexisting common law.161 The Florida statute, similar
to New York’s, is split into three parts: (1) rules applying to trustees with “absolute
power”; (2) rules applying to trustees without such power; and (3) rules applying
to both.162 If trustees with absolute power seek to decant, they may only do so
150

See La Ferlita, supra note 144, at 37; N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 10-6.6(c).

151

N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 10-6.6(c)(1).

152

Id. § 10-6.6(c)(2).

153

Id. § 10-6.6(c)(3), (4).

154

Id. § 10-6.6(d)–(t).

155

Id. § 10-6.6(f ).

156

Id. § 10-6.6(g).

157

Id. § 10-6.6(j), (j)(1).

158

Id. § 10-6.6(j)(1).

159

Id. § 10-6.6(h), (o).

160

Id. § 10-6.6(q).

161

Fla. Stat. § 736.04117(11) (2018).

162

Id. § 736.04117(1)(a), (2)–(11).
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if the second trust maintains the same beneficiaries and does not decrease any
vested interest.163 Trustees may retain or omit powers of appointment unless the
power is a presently exercisable general power.164 Additionally, trustees may create
or modify powers of appointment if the powerholder is a current beneficiary of
the original trust or, if not a current beneficiary, if the “exercise of the power
of appointment may take effect only after the power holder becomes, or would
have become if then living, a current beneficiary” of the original trust.165 The
permissible objects of created or modified powers may differ from the original
trust’s identified class.166
Alternatively, trustees without the absolute power to invade trust corpus
may decant subject to further limitations.167 Such trustees must maintain a
“substantially similar” interest in the second trust as compared to beneficiaries’
interests in the original trust.168 Trustees may not create, modify, or remove
any powers of appointment by decanting unless the term of the second trust is
extended beyond the original trust’s term.169 If the term is extended beyond the
period in which the original trust would have terminated, trustees may include
language in the second trust granting absolute power to invade trust principal
and to create a power of appointment.170 Regardless of the power granted to the
trustee in the original trust, the Florida statute outlines certain regulations for
trustees.171 Trustees may not decant if it would result in contributions to the trust
that fail to qualify for, or would reduce, a tax benefit.172
Any exercise of decanting must be in a writing, signed, and acknowledged by
trustees exercising their decanting power.173 The statute prohibits trustees from
utilizing their decanting power to increase their compensation or to insulate
themselves from liability through indemnification.174 If choosing to decant,
trustees must give notice to all beneficiaries, anyone with the power to remove
or replace the trustee of the original trust, and the original trust’s settlor and
trustees.175 Finally, Florida trustees have no fiduciary duty to decant.176
163

Id. § 736.04117(2)(a).

164

Id. § 736.04117(2)(b)(1)–(2).

165

Id. § 736.04117(2)(b)(3)–(4).

166

Id. § 736.04117(2)(c).

167

Id. § 736.04117(3).

168

Id. § 736.04117(3)(a).

169

See id. § 736.04117(3)(b)–(d).

170

Id.

171

Id. § 736.04117(4)–(11).

172

Id. § 736.04117(4)(a).

173

Id. § 736.04117(6).

174

Id. § 736.04117(7)(d)(1)–(2).

175

Id. § 736.04117(8)(a).

176

Id. § 736.04117(10).
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Source
		
Colorado177

Florida178

345

Fiduciary Notice to Can Terms of
Duty to Beneficiaries Trust Prohibit
Decant
Required?
Decanting?

Liability for
Decanting
Trustees

Colo. Rev. Stat.
No
Yes, subject to
Yes
Reasonable
Ann. §§ 15-16-		
exceptions		
reliance
901 to -930				
standard
(2018)				
Fla. Stat.
No
Yes
Yes
§ 736.04117 (2018)				

Massachusetts179 Common Law
New York180

Maybe

No

Yes

Unclear

Unclear

N.Y. Estates,
No
Yes
Yes
Powers and				
Trusts Law 				
§ 10-6.6(b) to (t)				
(Consol. 2019)				

Likely none if
prudent
under the
circumstances

South Dakota181

S.D. Codified
Maybe
No
Yes
Laws § 55-2-15				
(2019)

Limited if
good faith

Wyoming182

Wyo. Stat.
Maybe
No
Yes
Ann. §§ 4-10-				
816(a)(xxviii),
(b) (2019)

None if
good faith

177
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 15-16-904, -907(3)(b) (2018). Requiring notice be excused
when there is a “beneficiary who is a minor and has no representative or to a person that is not
known to the fiduciary or is known to the fiduciary but cannot be located by the fiduciary after
reasonable diligence.” Id. § 15-16-907(4). Moreover, if the trustee acts with “reasonable care” in
attempting to comply with this requirement, the decanting is valid even if the trustee failed to
provide notice to a required party. Id. §§ 15-16-907(8), -903(3), -906, -911 to -912.
178

Fla. Stat. § 736.04117(2)–(3), (8), (10).

Because Massachusetts favors the settlor’s intent as evidenced by the terms of the trust, this
chart’s contents are only true insofar as the trust terms do not require otherwise. See Morse v. Kraft,
992 N.E.2d 1021, 1026 (Mass. 2013); Ferri v. Powell-Ferri, 72 N.E.3d 541, 543–44 (Mass. 2017).
179

180

N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 10-6.6(b)–(c), (h), (l)–(m).

Comment (a) to Restatement (Third) of trusts § 70 (Am. Law Inst. 2018) has been used
by some courts, hinting at a fiduciary duty to use all things available to do their job. See, e.g., In re
Admin. of the Lee R. Wintersteen Revocable Trust Agreement, 2018 S.D. 12, ¶ 14, 907 N.W.2d
785, 790 (2018). See also S.D. Codified Laws §§ 55-2-10, -15, -18 (2019).
181

See supra notes 96 –104 and accompanying text; Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 4-10-816(a)(xxviii),
(b) (2019).
182
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IV. Utilizing Decanting
Given trustees’ breadth of discretion in Wyoming to modify a trust through
decanting, current federal transfer tax provisions should encourage trustees to
reconsider the estate plans they manage.183 Such provisions include the doubling
of the estate tax exemption from $5.6 million for individuals and $11.2 million
for married couples effective in 2017 to $11.2 million for individuals and $22.4
million (marked for inflation) for married couples beginning in 2018.184 Of
the above-mentioned states, only Florida, South Dakota, and Wyoming do not
impose an income tax on nongrantor trusts.185 Unless the situs of the trust is
located within one of these jurisdictions, a trust’s potential goal to minimize tax
exposure is likely frustrated to the detriment of the settlor, the beneficiaries, and
the fiduciary.186 Regardless of whether a trust is already within such jurisdictions,
trusts may have been crafted before the effective date of current beneficial statutes
applicable to trusts restricting their ability to take advantage of permissible
statutory trust provisions.187 Additionally, even if a trust has its situs in such
jurisdictions and the trust is drafted to take full advantage of current trust laws,
changing circumstances—whether administrative, beneficiary related, practical,
or other reasons—may necessitate a different trust form.188 Finally, if a trust’s situs
is within a jurisdiction that creates a fiduciary duty to decant, trustees may face
liability for the failure to decant.189 This section, therefore, discusses three trust
forms into which Wyoming trustees may decant to more efficiently manage a
trust’s corpus.190

183
See generally Rebecca Sallen, Tax Cuts and Jobs Act: What Planners Need to Discuss with Their
Clients, The Legal Intelligence (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.law.com/thelegalintelligencer/sites/
thelegalintelligencer/2018/02/12/tax-cuts-and-jobs-act-what-estate-planners-need-to-discuss-withtheir-clients/?slreturn=20180626114856 (pointing to the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act changes to estate
taxes, including creative uses of powers of appointment and increased exemption amounts); Tax
Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 1, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017) [hereinafter TCJA]
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). Many provisions of the TCJA sunset in
2026. See generally id.
184

Sallen, supra note 183; see 26 U.S.C. § 2010(c)(3)(A), (C) (2019).

Richard W. Nenno, Minimizing or Eliminating State Income Taxes on Trusts, in Est., Tax &
Pers. Fin. Plan. Update 6 (Edward F. Koren, ed., 2018), available at https://www.wilmingtontrust.
com/repositories/wtc_sitecontent/PDF/Minimizing-or-Eliminating-State-Income-Taxes-onTrusts.pdf; see also Reimer, supra note 2, at 176 –77.
185

186

Cf. Reimer, supra note 2, at 176.

187

See infra notes 192–293 and accompanying text.

188

See, e.g., infra notes 203– 08 and accompanying text.

See infra notes 322–36 and accompanying text. These reasons, however, require an
evaluation that is beyond the scope of this Comment.
189

See supra notes 183– 89 and accompanying text; infra notes 191–293 and accompanying
text. While this Comment discusses how decanting can help utilize these trusts, this Comment only
analyzes the trusts under Wyoming decanting law.
190
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A. Type of Trust
Many uses for decanting exist in Wyoming, but this Comment focuses on
three in particular, which are, in order of complexity, Asset Protection Trusts
(APT), Qualified Terminable Interest Property Trusts (QTIP), and Grantor
Retained Annuity Trusts (GRAT).191

1. Asset Protection Trusts
A staple of Wyoming trust law, the APT exists in only a minority of states.192
Of the states discussed above, only Wyoming and South Dakota have statutes
authorizing APTs.193 APTs generally take the form of “a discretionary irrevocable
trust where the grantor/settlor is a permissible beneficiary.”194 APTs implicate
public policy issues—such as the potential for doctors to utilize APTs to shield
their personal assets from malpractice creditors—but Wyoming and South
Dakota permit APTs notwithstanding such concerns.195 Wyoming’s APT statutes
prohibit creation of an APT if creation would violate the Uniform Fraudulent
Transfers Act.196 Additionally, Wyoming’s APT statutes require any APT creation
to be accompanied by a “qualified transfer affidavit,” stating that the settlor is not
creating the APT to defraud any existing or expected creditors.197 Absent clear
and convincing proof of a fraudulent transfer, APTs allow trustees to insulate trust
corpus from attachment by creditors.198
APTs are beneficial to trustees for various reasons, including tax planning
techniques, protection from creditors, and control by the settlor.199 Principally,
APTs allow the settlor to “enjoy[] the fruits of the trust assets” while not having
191

See supra notes 183–89 and accompanying text; infra 191–293 and accompanying text.

Staehr, supra note 2, at 311. States allowing APTs include Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii,
Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. For more information on APTs
in states other than Wyoming, see Shaftel, supra note 2.
192

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 4-10-505, -510 to -523 (2019); S.D. Codified Laws §§ 55-16-1
to -17 (2019).
193

194

King & McDowell, supra note 129, at 282.

195

Patricia Cohen, States Vie to Shield the Wealth of the 1 Percent, N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 2016, at B1.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 4-10-517. The Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act generally prohibits
transfers that would otherwise prevent a lawful creditor from collecting upon incurred debts. See
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 34-14-201 to -212.
196

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 4-10-523. For an example of a court nullifying an APT, finding the
settlors created the APT to defraud creditors, see Toni 1 Trust v. Wacker, 413 P.3d 1199 (Alaska 2018).
197

198

See, e.g., Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 4-10-514, -517.

See Kathryn G. Henkel & Judith K. Tobey, Estate Planning and Wealth Preservation
S53-11 to -12 (2003 & Supp. 2019); Michael P. Panebianco, 10 Non-Tax Reasons You Should Have
an Estate Plan: When All is Said and Done, Control is the Most Important, N.H. Bus. Rev. 24, 24 (July
6, 2018).
199
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a “legal right to transfer title or direct proceeds to creditors.”200 In addition to
control, a trustee’s authority to distribute trust corpus to the settlor does not
alone cause the trust corpus to be included within the taxable estate of the
settlor.201 Although APTs created under Wyoming law provide significant asset
protection, it is uncertain how courts will reconcile public policy concerns with
self-settled APTs.202
Given the insulating benefits of APTs, trustees should consider decanting
into an APT in certain circumstances.203 While Wyoming settlors, trustees, or
trust protectors can make an election to transform an irrevocable trust into an
APT, the transformation could ultimately require a party to petition the court.204
In Wyoming, if the trustee of the original trust decants, the trustee may maintain
her position as the trustee in the second trust (creating an APT) or appoint the
settlor as the trustee or co-trustee (creating a “self-settled” APT).205 Regardless of
the trustee’s position, the decanting must meet Wyoming’s legal requirements.206
The second trust must be irrevocable, state that it is a “qualified spendthrift
trust” under § 4-10-510, expressly incorporate Wyoming law, and provide that
the settlor’s interest is subject to a spendthrift provision under § 4-10-502.207 If
trustees determine it is appropriate, they may include various provisions, such as
a settlor’s veto power over distributions, certain powers of appointment, and the
settlor’s right to add or remove trustees without fear of being deemed revocable by
Wyoming courts.208

200
Eric Boughman, Practical Considerations for Using Self-Settled Trusts, Forbes (Feb. 9, 2017,
8:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbeslegalcouncil/2017/02/09/practical-considerationsfor-using-self-settled-trusts/#7a8ab67b2844 (“[T]he grantor may ‘have his cake (protection) and
eat it (the assets) too.’”).
201

I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200944002, at 10 (July 15, 2009).

See, e.g., Bogert et al., supra note 78, § 223 (“[T]he validity of the domestic asset protection
trusts has not yet been challenged in a court of a state that does not enforce spendthrift provisions
for the settlor.”); Brendan Duffy, In States We Trust: Self-Settled Trusts, Public Policy, and Interstate
Federalism, 111 Nw. U. L. Rev. 205, 218 (2016) (citing a lack of plaintiffs to sue, settlements saving
court disposition, and court inhibition to determine issues on APTs with hope state legislatures
would settle the debate).
202

203

See infra notes 193–202 and accompanying text.

204

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 4-10-516, -111, -112.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 4-10-513(b) (“A transfer by a trustee that is not a qualified trustee to a
trustee that is a qualified trustee shall be treated as a qualified transfer.”).
205

206

See infra notes 207– 08 and accompanying text.

207

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 4-10-510(a)(i)–(iii).

208

Id. § 4-10-510(a)(iv)(A), (B), (G).
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2. The Qualified Terminable Interest Property Trust
The Internal Revenue Code (Code) imposes a tax “on the transfer of the taxable
estate of every decedent.”209 If transfers exceed $1,000,000 and the transferor has
no available deductions or exclusions, for example, the Code imposes a tax of
$345,800 plus 40% of the value of the gift in excess of $1,000,000.210 For married
clients wishing to maintain control of property after death while simultaneously
avoiding any estate tax liability for the assets passing through the estate of the firstto-die spouse and ensuring the surviving spouse receives a benefit from such assets
for the remainder of her lifetime, a special tax election is available.211 This election
may, however, only be made in conjunction with the creation of a QTIP.212
The primary purpose of a QTIP trust is to utilize the marital deduction while
allowing the decedent to maintain control over the ultimate disposition of the
assets held by the QTIP.213 The QTIP is a useful tool for managing estates, as it
provides the ability to craft efficient tax planning and offers relative flexibility.214
For example, QTIPs allow clients to weigh the importance of creating a credit
shelter trust with the non-elected portion of the exclusion amount (achieved
through a partial QTIP election) against the importance of obtaining a stepped-up
tax basis on property upon the surviving spouse’s death (achieved through a full
QTIP election).215 Further, if the couple’s estate value is under the $22,400,000
threshold, then a QTIP simplifies the estate planning strategy by controlling the
disposition of assets with a single trust.216 Once in a QTIP, the surviving spouse’s
creditors cannot reach the trust assets.217 Property within a QTIP, however, is

209

I.R.C. § 2001(a) (2019).

Id. § 2001(c). Deductions exist for such transfers, including the option to transfer the
property during life, but discussion of such transfers is hardly useful for Wyoming practitioners.
Cf. id. § 2001.
210

Id. § 2056(b)(7). This election is made on IRS Form 706. See About Form 706, United
States Estate (and Generation-Skipping Transfer) Tax Return, I.R.S., https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/
about-form-706 (last visited Apr. 2, 2019) (providing links to pdf Form 706 and pdf Instructions for
Form 706).
211

212

Henkel & Tobey, supra note 199, at 50-2 to -6.

Dana R. Irwin, Removing the Scaffolding: The QTIP Provisions and the Ownership Fiction,
84 Neb. L. Rev. 571, 581–82, 584 (2005).
213

Louis S. Harrison, Estate & Succession Planning Corner: The Orwellian Look to the Future
of Our Practice, or At Least Our Estate Planning Practice in 2018, J. Passthrough Entities 13, 14
(Nov./Dec. 2018).
214

215

Id.

Id. at 14 n.1. A single QTIP also guards against costly trustee mistakes, such as causing the
trust to lose the tax savings it was created to utilize. See Alexander A. Bove Jr., Should Your Client’s
GRAT, CRUT, SLAT, ILIT, QPRT, MQT, DAPT, or SNT Have a Protector?, 20 Prob. & Prop. Mag.
54, 54 (2016).
216

David Pratt & Nathan R. Brown, Estate Planning in 2015 and Beyond: No Longer a OneSize-Fits-All Approach, 89 Fla. B.J. 24, 28 (Feb. 2015).
217
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subject to tax upon the surviving spouse’s death on appreciation accumulated
after the original transfer into the QTIP.218
Decanting into a QTIP is advisable only if the original trust is one in which
the trust’s assets would be included within the settlor’s estate upon death.219 If,
upon the death of a settlor, a trustee of an existing trust settled by the decedentspouse wishes to make use of the marital deduction, then decanting into a QTIP
may be beneficial.220 If so, the second trust must meet the QTIP requirements
under the Code: the surviving spouse must receive all trust income, must be the
sole beneficiary during her lifetime, and the decedent-spouse, or her executor,
must make an election for QTIP treatment.221 With the exception of the election,
each of the QTIP provisions command the trust document to specify certain
provisions as stated in the Code.222 Those provisions include requiring the trustee
to have authority to create, in further trust, a second trust granting the surviving
spouse all trust income for his or her sole benefit during life.223 Under Wyoming
law, the trustee’s broad powers appear to permit decanting into a QTIP trust
unless the original trust expressly states otherwise.224
If trustees are administering a QTIP, that too may be decanted if the trustees
determine it is needed.225 Trustees may decant to a QTIP trust with a spendthrift
provision, prohibiting the surviving spouse or beneficiaries from assigning their
interests, which may add more protection from “subsequent husbands, subsequent
divorces, [surviving spouse’s] creditors, overly importunate charities, family
members,” or other creditors unforeseen at the time of drafting.226 Additionally,
trustees may decant to modify the spouse’s right to invade trust principal, or
to add a testamentary limited power of appointment.227 If choosing to decant
an existing QTIP, however, trustees should ensure that the second trust—or the
original trust after modification—qualifies for the marital deduction at that time
or whether a subsequent election must be made.228

218
Id. However, such tax may be circumvented through a combined approach of a QTIP and
a grantor trust. Id.
219

See generally Irwin, supra note 213, at 581–82, 584.

220

See supra notes 213 –18 and accompanying text.

221

I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)(B) (2019); see also Henkel & Tobey, supra note 199, at 50-2 to -6.

222

I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)(B); see also Henkel & Tobey, supra note 199, at 50-2 to -6.

223

I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)(B); see also Henkel & Tobey, supra note 199, at 4-5 to -12.

224

Cf. Staehr, supra note 2, at 340 (noting that Wyoming trustees have broad powers).

225

Henkel & Tobey, supra note 199, at 4-10 to -12.

Id. at 4 -10. For a more thorough discussion of spendthrift provisions, see supra note 78 and
accompanying text.
226

227

Id. at 4-11, S4-16 to -18.

228

I.R.C. § 2056.
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3. Grantor Retained Annuity Trust
The final trust type into which Wyoming trustees may wish to decant is the
Grantor Retained Annuity Trust (GRAT).229 Existing caselaw neither supports
nor negates the proposition that trustees may decant an irrevocable trust into a
GRAT.230 Regardless, logic supports the possibility and the immense benefits spur
the desire for Wyoming trustees to decant into a GRAT.231
The GRAT was created in 1990 as the result of Congress’s repeal of § 2036(c)
of the Code to prevent the rampant use of the Grantor Retained Income Trust
(GRIT) to make inter vivos gifts.232 A grantor established a GRIT by transferring
property into an irrevocable trust, retaining a right to income for some period of
years, and granting the remainder to the remaindermen.233 The grantor’s transfer
into the GRIT was taxable in the amount of the value of the remainder interest
as defined under the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) valuation tables.234 This
benefited grantors because the remainder interest’s present-day value took into
account the time-value of money and was significantly lower than the fair market
value of the property.235
For example, A transfers property with a fair market value of $100,000 into
a GRIT, retaining income for a term of ten years, at which time the GRIT is
to terminate and distribute to A’s child, B.236 B’s remainder interest is valued—
taking into account the time-value of money—at $30,000.237 Gift tax is due upon
A’s transfer, but A only paid tax upon the $30,000 remainder interest B receives
instead of the $100,000 fair market value.238 As illustrated in this example,
the GRIT allows grantors to make more money for the remaindermen than a
comparable outright gift—a possibility Congress sought to limit.239
Under the post-1990 tax regime, § 2702 of the Code established the GRAT
and the Grantor Retained Unitrust (GRUT), allowing individuals to remove
229

Id. § 2702.

230

See infra notes 285– 88 and accompanying text.

231

See infra note 287 and accompanying text.

Mitchell M. Gans, GRIT’s, GRAT’s and GRUT’s: Planning and Policy, 11 Va. Tax Rev.
761, 764 (1992).
232

233

See Gans, supra note 232, at 765, 765 n.1 & 3.

234

Id. at 765; I.R.C. § 7520.

Cf. Wheeler v. United States, 116 F.3d 749, 758 (5th Cir. 1997) (discussing an example
where the fee simple value of the property was $100,000 and the value of the remainder interest,
calculated according to the valuation tables, no more than $30,000).
235

236

See Gradow v. United States, 11 Cl. Ct. 808, 815 (1987).

237

Id.

238

Id.; Gans, supra note 232, at 763 n.3.

239

Gans, supra note 232, at 763.
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value from their estates in a manner similar to the GRIT.240 Section 2702 of the
Code determines whether the transfer of an interest in trust to, or for the benefit
of, a family member is a gift that qualifies for the section’s valuation treatment.241
To qualify, the transfer must be a complete gift.242 The transfer also must not
be one that would qualify as a Qualified Personal Residence Trust (QPRT) or a
charitable remainder trust.243
Second, the Code distinguishes treatment between qualified and non-qualified
interests.244 Qualified annuity interests are those allowing the right to receive
annuity payments.245 The individual retaining an interest, deemed the “holder” by
the Code, includes the transferor and her spouse, the lineal descendants of either,
and any spouses of such descendants.246 The qualified annuity interest cannot be
one that includes a right of withdrawal, nor may it be paid through the issuance
of “a debt instrument, option, or other similar financial instrument.”247 Nor
may the “fixed payment” include any income generated by the trust property.248
The amount of the annuity must be fixed, but it may periodically change to the
extent the amount changed is not in excess of 120% of the stated amount in the
previous year.249 If the interest is qualified, then the value of the retained interest
is calculated according to the § 7520 valuation tables.250 Assuming the transfer
is non-exempt and the retained interest is a qualified interest, § 2702 of the
Code applies.251
Section 2702’s general rule is that, “by setting value of the retained interest
at zero,” the remainder interest transferred and the full fee interest are valued the

240
I.R.C. § 2702 (2019). This term can be for life or for a term of years shorter than life.
Id. However, the life term is “never a good idea.” Henkel & Tobey, supra note 199, at 22-2.
Section 2702 is merely a valuation provision. I.R.C. § 2702(a). This Comment only discusses the
requirements of the GRAT, but the same general Code and Regulation apply to GRUTs.
241

I.R.C. § 2702(a)(1); see also Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-2(d)(1) to (6) (2019).

I.R.C. §§ 2702(a)(3)(A)(i), (a)(3)(B). A “complete gift” requires the grantor to part with
“dominion and control” so that she cannot change the disposition of the property held in trust.
Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(b).
242

243
I.R.C. § 2702(a)(3)(A)(i), (ii). For further information on the QPRT and the charitable
remainder trust, see Treasury Regulation § 25.2702-5 and § 644 of the Code, respectively.
244

I.R.C. § 2702(a)(2).

245

Id. § 2702(b)(1); Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-3(b)(1)(i).

246

I.R.C. §§ 2701(e)(2), 2702(a)(1).

247

Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-3(b)(1)(i).

248

Id. § 25.2702-3(b)(1)(iii).

249

Id. § 25.2702-3(b)(1)(ii)(A).

I.R.C. § 2702(a)(2)(B). Alternatively, if the retained interest is not a qualified interest, then
the value is zero. Id. § 2702(a)(2)(A).
250

251

Id. § 2702(a); Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-1(a).
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same.252 If the interest is not a qualified interest, then the value of the gift is the
entire value of the transferred property.253 If the retained interest is a qualified
annuity interest, however, then the amount of the gift is determined by
subtracting the value of the retained interest from the value of the transferred
property.254 While the current valuation of the property transferred, its fair market
value, is simple enough to calculate, the heart of § 2702 is its valuation of a
retained interest.255 If the retained interest is a qualified annuity, then the value
of the retained interest is calculated by the § 7520 valuation tables.256 When
compared to granting a gift outright, § 2702’s treatment of qualified annuity
interests reduces the grantor’s gift tax burden by the value of the retained interest,
as opposed to paying gift tax on the fair market value of the gift.257
The GRAT, allowed if § 2702 applies, is a beneficial estate planning technique
because it removes property from the grantor’s estate, triggering little to no gift
tax in the process.258 This is true, however, only if the grantor survives the term
chosen and the transferred property appreciates faster than the § 7520 rate.259
When the grantor transfers property to the GRAT, she states a term of years
to retain an annuity.260 If the grantor outlives the term’s expiration, then upon
completion of the term the assets will pass to the named beneficiaries either in
further trust or outright.261 If the grantor dies prior to the expiration of the term,
the entire GRAT corpus is included within the grantor’s estate.262 Maximum tax
savings, therefore, require the grantor to choose an annuity term shorter than the
grantor’s life expectancy.263
If the grantor survives the term and the trust property passes to the remain
dermen, the GRAT’s appeal comes to fruition only if the transferred property
252

Wheeler v. United States, 116 F.3d 749, 767 (5th Cir. 1997); I.R.C § 2702(a)(2).

253

Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-1(b).

254

Id.

255

Cf. Henkel & Tobey, supra note 199, at 22-2 to -26.

256

Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-2(b); I.R.C. § 7520.

Jonathan G. Blattmachr & Diana S.C. Zeydel, Evaluating the Potential Success of a GRAT
Against Competing Strategies to Transfer Wealth, Tax Mgmt. Memo. 19, 19–20 (Jan. 23, 2006).
257

258

Id.

259

Id.

260

I.R.C. § 2702(c)(3).

261

Henkel & Tobey, supra note 199, at 22-2.

See, e.g., T.D. 9414, 2008-2 C.B. 454, 8 (2008); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9451056, 17 (Sept.
26, 1994). For more information, see generally Michael Whitty, Repercussions of Walton Estate Tax
Inclusion of GRAT Remainder, 19 Prob. & Prop. 12, 17 (May/June 2005); Blattmachr & Zeydel,
supra note 257, at 20.
262

263
See Blattmachr & Zeydel, supra note 257, at 19–20. One method of planning for the
grantor dying prior to the term completion—as well as the risk that the GRAT property does not
outperform the § 7250 rate—is to utilize the parallel GRAT plan. Id. For further information on
parallel GRAT plans, see id.
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appreciates faster than the § 7520 rate.264 This result ensues because the grantor
computes her gift tax liability by subtracting the value of the retained interest from
the value of the gift.265 The value of the retained interest is stated on the GRAT’s
governing document, obtained by multiplying the term of the retained interest
by the annual payments due.266 The value of the gift is calculated at the end of
the term when the GRAT corpus transfers to the remaindermen, obtained by
compounding the initial fair market value of the gift annually by the § 7520 rate.267
If the trust property appreciates at a higher rate than the retained interest, and
the retained interest exceeded the fair market value of the property at the time of
transfer, then the excess appreciation and corpus will pass to the remaindermen.268
The gamble, however, is that the trust property could appreciate at a lower rate
than the § 7520 rate.269 Assuming the grantor retained an interest in excess of
the initial fair market value of the transferred property, there will not be enough
corpus in the trust to satisfy the annuity paid to the holder; with nothing left in
the GRAT at the end of the term, the remaindermen get nothing.270 Exacerbating
such an injury, if the GRAT appreciates slower than the § 7520 rate, it is possible
that a direct gift to the intended beneficiaries—including having to pay the
applicable gift tax—would have resulted in less gift tax liability.271
For example, K is a fifty-year-old married woman with a combined estate
presently valued at $22,000,000. One year ago, K purchased 10,000 shares of
X-stock, a promising tech start-up company, for which she paid $5 a share.
Over the past year, K watched the price of X-stock increase to $10 a share.
Expecting X-stock to increase in value and wishing to take advantage of the
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017’s (TCJA) increased basic exemption amount, K
transfers 10,000 shares of her X-stock into a GRAT. After consulting the IRS
life expectancy tables—expecting she has 34.2 years remaining—K’s GRAT
provides for a retained interest of $199,447.16 over a twenty-five-year term
(receiving $7,977.89 annually).272 At the completion of the term, the GRAT will

264
Id. (“[T]he GRAT captures for the remainder beneficiaries the outperformance not just on
the remainder interest, but also on the funds that will be used to pay the annuity.”).
265

See id.

266

Id.

267

Id.

268

Id.; Gans, supra note 232, at 800– 03.

269

Gans, supra note 232, at 833.

270

Blattmachr & Zeydel, supra note 257, at 20–21.

Id. (stating if, for example, the § 7520 rate was 5% and the GRAT earned less than 5%,
but no less than 4%, “the remainder beneficiaries of the GRAT will receive less than if a direct
gift . . . had been made.”) Id.
271

See Distributions from Individual Retirement Arrangements (IRAs), I.R.S. Pub. 590-B,
44–45 (2018) (Table I, Single Life Expectancy). Because the transferred property is stock expected
to appreciate significantly, K may wish the GRAT to periodically increase the annuity. This scheme is
272
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terminate and distribute to the benefit of L, the sole child of K and her husband,
in further trust.273
Assuming K lives beyond the twenty-five-year term, K will pay no gift tax
upon transfer of X-stock into the GRAT and the subsequent distribution to L.
To calculate the tax burden, K will determine the value of the entire property,
increased by the § 7520 rate for the term of years, at the time of transfer and
subtract the amount of her retained interest.274 K’s retained interest, as stated
in the governing documents of the GRAT, is an annual right to $8,791.29 for
twenty-five years.275 The entire value of that retained interest over the course
of the GRAT is $199,447.16.276 Next, K will calculate the amount of the gift
by compounding the $100,000 initial transfer by the § 7520 rate over twentyfive years. The current § 7520 rate for June 2019 is 2.8%.277 The value of
the gift, therefore, is $199,447.16.278 Subtracting the retained interest from the
value of the gift ($199,447.16 less $199,447.16), K’s transfer results in zero gift
tax liability.279
If K, who already gifted an amount equal to her lifetime exclusion amount,
made an outright gift of X-stock instead of utilizing the GRAT technique, the
transfer would be treated as a taxable gift causing her to lose the use of a portion
of her exemption.280 To calculate the total gift tax due upon K’s transfer of 10,000
shares of X-stock to L, the first step is to determine the corresponding tax bracket
with respect to the value of the gift.281 Because K has used her entire lifetime
exclusion amount, the Code states the $100,000 gift corresponds to a tax of

lawful under § 2702 but, because it adds unnecessary complexity, it will not be used here. For further
information on graduated annuities, see Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-3(b)(1)(ii)(A), (e) ex. 2 (2019).
273

See Henkel & Tobey, supra note 199, at 22-2.

274

See id. at 22-16.

To obtain this figure, compound the initial transfer of $100,000 by the § 7520 rate of
2.8%, then divide the result by the 25-year GRAT term.
275

276

To obtain this figure, compound the initial transfer of $100,000 by the § 7520 rate of 2.8%.

I.R.S. Rev. Rul. 2019-04, tbl. 5 (Jan. 28, 2019); Section 7520 Interest Rates, I.R.S., https://
www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/section-7520-interest-rates (last visited
Mar. 4, 2019). For past § 7520 rates, see Section 7520 Interest Rates for Prior Years, I.R.S., https://
www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/section-7520-interest-rates-for-prior-years
(last visited Feb. 3, 2019). While the § 7520 rate is current as of publication, it changes monthly.
For the current rate, see Section 7520 Interest Rates, I.R.S., https://www.irs.gov/businesses/smallbusinesses-self-employed/section-7520-interest-rates (last visited Apr. 24, 2019).
277

278
For an online interest calculator, see Compound Interest Calculator, MoneyChimp, http://
www.moneychimp.com/calculator/compound_interest_calculator.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2019).
279

Id.

280

Henkel & Tobey, supra note 199, at 22-2.

281

I.R.C. § 2001(c) (2019).
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$18,200 plus 28% of that in excess of $80,000.282 As calculated, the total tax
liability K must pay upon transfer to L is $23,800.283 Utilizing a GRAT, therefore,
obtains greater tax savings than an outright gift.284
One application of the decanting power with respect to GRATs is allowing
trustees the power to react to changed circumstances.285 Specifically, decanting
may be beneficial with respect to GRATs in two situations: decanting either an
existing GRAT to modify provisions, or decanting an irrevocable trust into a
GRAT.286 While support exists for the proposition that trustees may decant an
existing GRAT, it is unclear whether trustees may decant an irrevocable trust
into a GRAT.287 This Comment suggests a novel application of the Wyoming
decanting power to benefit Wyoming settlors by modifying GRAT provisions.288
Trustees should decant existing GRATs in the face of changed circumstances
or drafting errors.289 Of the above-mentioned states, only South Dakota explicitly
restricts trustees decanting a GRAT.290 In South Dakota, trustees may not decant
if the decanting reduces the income interest of any beneficiaries of a GRAT.291
Practically, however, this restriction may exist in all decanting jurisdictions
because a beneficiary would likely sue for the violation of some other fiduciary
282

Id.

Cf. id. The total tax liability is calculated by adding $18,200 to 28% of the difference of
$100,000 and $80,000. In equation form, total gift tax liability is calculated as such: $18,200 +
(0.28 x ($100,000 - $80,000)) = $23,800.
283

Compare supra note 283 and accompanying text, with supra note 279 and accompanying
text. This assumes the property would have increased in value at a greater rate than the § 7520 rate
because, if it did not, then there could be a time-value-of-money consideration potentially making
an outright gift a more efficient transfer. See infra notes 235–38 and accompanying text.
284

285

See infra notes 286 –93 and accompanying text.

Cf. Bove Jr., supra note 216, at 54. Other circumstances can occur, but this Comment
limits its discussion to these two examples.
286

See infra notes 289–93 and accompanying text. Decanting from an irrevocable trust into
a GRAT, if possible, provides significant tax opportunities for income otherwise taxable to the
irrevocable trust. See generally I.R.C. §§ 641, 671–677 (2019). The rate of that tax is dependent on
a number of factors, including whether the trust is a grantor trust. Id. § 671– 677. If the trust is a
non-grantor trust, the TCJA amended § 1 of the Code providing a rate schedule for determining
the income tax payable by the trust upon income generated by trusts. Id. § 1(j)(2)(E) (2019). This
rate schedule sunsets in 2026. Id. § 1(j). For income generated between the years 2018 and 2025,
the TCJA taxes income over $12,500 as $3,011.50 plus 37% of that over $12,500. Id. § 1(j)(2)(E).
In addition to the income tax, the Code imposes a Net Investment Income Tax (NIIT) of 3.8%
in certain circumstances. Id. § 1411(a). Just as GRATs freeze the estate by transferring income
generated by estate assets to beneficiaries tax-free, so too may decanting from irrevocable trusts to
GRATs allow trustees to freeze the trust assets. Cf. supra notes 232–84 and accompanying text.
287

288

For potential uses of trust decanting with GRATs, see Broderick, supra note 110.

289

See generally Bove Jr., supra note 216, at 54.

290

S.D. Codified Laws § 55-2-15(6)(c) (2019).

291

Id.
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duty if the decanting reduced that beneficiary’s income interests.292 If trustees do
not decrease the income interest of a GRAT, then decanting is lawful in South
Dakota and practical in all other jurisdictions.293

B. Tax Consequences
Although decanting allows significant planning benefits, Wyoming trustees
must be mindful of the tax consequences of decanting prior to acting upon their
statutory authority.294 The tax consequences of decanting are continually evolving,
but some clarity exists from the IRS.295 As of March 3, 2017, decanting, in and
of itself, is a nonrecognition event if the interests in the first and second trust
are “basically the same.”296 Private Letter Ruling (PLR) 201709020 addresses the
consequences of a trustee decanting a trust created after 1985.297 Pursuant to
the terms of the trust, the trustee sought to divide the original trust into eight
separate trusts for the benefit of the beneficiaries.298 Prior to making any division,
the trustee sought guidance on the tax consequences of such a division and
distribution.299 The IRS determined the resolution of the trustee’s question hinged
on whether the distribution was a material difference under Cottage Savings
Association v. Commissioner.300
In Cottage Savings, the Supreme Court addressed whether Cottage Savings’s
exchange of its interests in one group of mortgages for another lender’s interest
in a separate group of mortgages was a recognition event.301 Cottage Savings
sought to treat the exchange as a recognition event so as to trigger losses built
into its holdings of mortgages; but, for a recognition event to occur, there must

William P. Lapiana, Balancing the Duty of Impartiality and Decanting to Eliminate an
Interest, 45 Est. Plan. 41, 42 (2018). Functionally, decanting to reduce a beneficiary’s interest in a
GRAT could make the initial gift tax calculation incorrect, resulting in a potential IRS audit. Cf.
Henkel & Tobey, supra note 199, at 22-16 to -26 (stating that the remainder beneficiary’s interest is
used to calculate gift tax liability, indicating that a change to the beneficiary’s interest would change
the gift tax calculation).
292

293

S.D. Codified Laws § 55-2-15(6)(c).

294

See infra notes 295–321 and accompanying text.

Committo, supra note 132, at 15; I.R.S. Rev. Proc. 2019-03, 2019-01 I.R.B. 130 (Jan.
2, 2019).
295

Committo, supra note 132, at 14; I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201709020, 1 (Sept. 12, 2016). A
nonrecognition event is a tax-free disposition of property. See generally Boris I. Bittker & Lawrence
Lokken, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts, ¶ 44.1.1, Westlaw (database updated
Mar. 2019).
296

297

I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201709020, 36.

298

Id. at 12.

299

Id. at 13.

300

Id. at 24–26; Cottage Savings Ass’n v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554, 562 (1991).

301

Cottage Savings Ass’n, 499 U.S. at 556.
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be a material difference in the exchange.302 Although the Court agreed with
the Commissioner’s argument that the exchanged interests were substantially
identical, the Court concluded there was a material difference between the
exchanged mortgages notwithstanding the interests’ similarities.303 Because the
two mortgages interests embodied “legally distinct entitlement[s],” there was an
exchange triggering Cottage Savings’s recognition of loss.304
The PLR utilized the Cottage Savings material difference test to determine
whether a sale or exchange occurred upon division of the first trust into eight
separate trusts.305 The trustee sought to transfer non-S Corporation stock from
the first trust into eight new trusts.306 In applying the Cottage Savings test, the IRS
asked whether the beneficiaries’ pre-division and distribution interests were any
different than their interests post-division and distribution.307 As the first trust
required any division into new trusts to be pro-rata, the IRS determined there
was no material difference upon transfer—the division and distribution were
non-recognition events.308 Therefore, because there was no sale or exchange, the
IRS held the decanting triggered neither capital gains tax to the trust nor income
tax to the beneficiaries.309 Further, because the transfer was by the trustee and not
the grantor, the assets were not includable within the grantor’s estate.310
Additionally, the IRS addressed how decanting may affect an exemption from
the GST tax.311 The Code imposes a tax upon any transfer to an individual two
or more generations below the grantor (skip persons) or to a trust whose interest
holders are either entirely skip persons or (if there is no current interest holder)
the trust may only ever distribute property to skip persons.312 Irrevocable trusts
established before September 26, 1985, have grandfathered status, exempting
the pre-dating trusts from the GST tax.313 If the trust was created on or after
302

Id. at 559 – 62; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(a) (2019).

303

Cottage Savings Ass’n, 499 U.S. at 566 – 68.

304

Id. at 568.

305

I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201709020, at 24–26 (Sept. 12, 2016).

306

Id. at 12.

307

Id. at 24–26.

308

Id.

Id. at 14 (“[T]he pro-rata transfer of assets from Trust to the Article THIRD Trusts will
not result in a sale or exchange, or other disposition, of any property for purposes of § 1001(a), and
thus no gain or loss will be recognized by the beneficiaries or the trusts on the division for purposes
of § 61(a)(3) or § 1001(c). We further conclude that the pro-rata transfer of assets from Trust into
the Article THIRD Trusts is not a distribution under § 661 or § 1.661(a)-2(f ) and therefore not
included in the gross income of any Article THIRD trust beneficiary under § 662.”).
309

310
Id. at 35 (“[N]o part of Trust or any other trust under the trust agreement is includible in
the gross estate of Grantor under §§ 2033, 2035, 2036, 2037, or 2038.”).
311

Id. at 16; see also Committo, supra note 132, at 15.

312

I.R.C. §§ 2601, 2613(a) (2019).

313

Treas. Reg. § 26.2601-1(b)(1)(i) (2019).
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September 26, 1985, the trust may be exempted from GST tax by an allocation
of the settlor’s GST exemption.314
The trust at issue in PLR 201709020, created after the Code’s 1985 imposi
tion of the GST tax and, therefore, subject to the tax, was exempted by means
of an allocation.315 Similar to the capital gains and income tax analyses, the IRS
concluded the division and distribution did not trigger any GST tax because the
new trusts maintained the same beneficiaries in the same ratios.316 Even if the
trust had been created before September 26, 1985, decanting the trust would not
necessarily have forfeited the grandfathered status.317
With the increased basic exemption amount under the TCJA, decanting
provides trustees increased efficiency in managing a trust’s corpus as long as
trustees carefully avoid potential tax pitfalls.318 The complex tax consequences
of decanting should not discourage Wyoming trustees from decanting; however,
significant caution should be exercised prior to decanting certain types of
trusts.319 If Wyoming trustees are administering a grandfathered GST trust, then
decanting, if improperly carried out, could void the grandfathered nature of the
trust.320 If properly carried out, however, decanting allows trustees to breathe new
life into trusts.321

V. A Fiduciary Duty to Decant?
After the Ferri court announced a potential duty to decant in Massachusetts,
trustees have faced the possibility of being subjected to a fiduciary duty to
314

See I.R.C. §§ 2631–2632.

I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201709020, 40 (Sept. 12, 2016) (“[S]ufficient GST exemption was
allocated to Trust so that Trust has an inclusion ratio of zero under § 2642.”).
315

Id. at 41 (“[T]he transfer of assets from [the first trust] to the [eight new] trusts will not
alter the inclusion ratio of [first trust], and each [of the eight new trusts] will have the same inclusion
ratio as Trust for GST tax purposes.”).
316

317

Cf. id.; see also Blattmachr et al., supra note 16, at 166.

Cf. William G. Gale et al., Urban-Brookings Tax Pol’y Ctr., Effects of the Tax Cuts
Act: A Preliminary Analysis 5 (June 13, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/
uploads/2018/06/ES_20180608_tcja_summary_paper_final.pdf; see also Sallen, supra note 183.
318

and Jobs

The specifics of decanting a grandfathered trust are outside the scope of this Comment.
However, for further information on decanting GST grandfathered or exempt trusts, see Blattmachr
et al., supra note 16, at 166 – 67 and Committo, supra note 132, at 15.
319

Treas. Reg. § 26.2601-1 (2019); see also Diana S.C. Zeydel & Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Tax
Effects of Decanting—Obtaining and Preserving the Benefits, 111 J. Tax’n 288, 292 (2009) (“[T]he
trust remains grandfathered even if a beneficiary holds and exercises a special power of appointment
as long as the vesting of ownership of the trust property occurs by the end of the historic rule
against perpetuities”). See generally William R. Culp, Jr. & Briani Bennett Mellen, Trust Decanting:
An Overview and Introduction to Creative Planning Opportunities, 45 Real Prop., Tr. & Est. L.J.
1, 1 (2010).
320

321

See supra notes 294 – 320 and accompanying text.
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decant.322 Of the two types of authority for decanting (common law and
statutory), a fiduciary duty to decant is more likely to be imposed in common
law jurisdictions.323 First, looking to Massachusetts, trustees still have no guidance
on the limits, or even an affirmation of the existence of, the fiduciary duty to
decant.324 Because of the factual background of Ferri, Massachusetts trustees must
balance this potential duty against public policy concerns to determine the duty’s
contours.325 For example, trustees must determine whether public policy supports
decanting in a manner which deprives a divorcing spouse from trust corpus that
would otherwise be included within the marital estate.326
In contrast, many of the states adopting statutory decanting provisions have
clarified there is no fiduciary duty to decant.327 Recognizing that a potential
fiduciary duty exists in some states under common law, the UTDA expressly
states that its decanting statute does not establish a duty to decant.328 Trustees
in Colorado or California, therefore, face no affirmative duty to decant.329
Additionally, New York and Florida preclude any fiduciary duty from arising
in their respective statutes.330 In South Dakota, the statute is silent on whether
a fiduciary duty exists, but the South Dakota Supreme Court favorably relied
on a comment to the Restatement indicating a fiduciary duty to decant does
not exist.331
Trustees in Wyoming should be cautious of a potential fiduciary duty to
decant even though it is unclear whether Wyoming trustees have such a duty.332
No caselaw currently interprets § 4-10-816(a)(xxviii) or (b), leaving Wyoming
trustees without guidance on whether a fiduciary duty to decant exists.333 Instead,
Wyoming trustees are left only with twenty-five words stating that decanting
322

Ferri v. Powell-Ferri, 72 N.E.3d 541, 550 (Mass. 2017).

Melissa J. Williams, Decanting Trusts: Irrevocable, Not Unchangeable, 6 Est. Plan. &
Community Prop. L.J. 35, 61 (2013).
323

324

Bloostein, supra note 74, at 40.

Rebecca Tunney, Decanting in Massachusetts: Where Do We Stand Now, 99 Mass. L. Rev. 62,
67 (2018).
325

326

Id.

327

Williams, supra note 323, at 61.

328

Unif. Trust Decanting Act § 4 (Unif. Law Comm’n 2015).

329

Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15-16-904(2) (2018); Cal. Prob. Code § 19504(b) (Deering 2019).

N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 10-6.6(l) (Consol. 2019); Fla. Stat. § 736.04117
(10) (2018).
330

331
In re Admin. of the Lee R. Wintersteen Revocable Trust Agreement, 907 N.W.2d 785,
790 (S.D. 2018) (quoting Restatement Third of Trusts § 70 gen. cmt. a (Am. Law Inst. 2007)
(“[A]ll powers held in the capacity of trustee must be exercised, or not exercised, in accordance with
the trustee’s fiduciary obligations.”)).
332

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 4-10-816(a)(xxvii) (2019).

333

Id. § 4-10-816(a)(xvii), (b).
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in good faith shields them from liability.334 Although not direct evidence, other
enumerated fiduciary duties indicate support for an affirmative duty to decant if
decanting furthers another fiduciary duty.335 Should decanting best provide for
the interests of the trust beneficiaries, then it is at least comprehensible that a
Wyoming court could find an affirmative duty to decant.336

VI. Conclusion
Decanting provides an efficient and effective tool for trustees to manage trust
assets and react to changed circumstances not anticipated when the trust was
originally created.337 Although a number of states, including Colorado, Florida,
Massachusetts, New York, South Dakota, and Wyoming allow decanting,
Wyoming arguably provides the broadest decanting powers.338 Taking into
account Wyoming’s laws, the broad powers available to Wyoming trustees place
them in a competitive position to best move, manage, and protect a trust’s corpus
compared to trustees in other jurisdictions.339 If trustees manage trusts for clients
outside of Wyoming, they should consider moving those trusts to Wyoming.340
Once in Wyoming, or if already in Wyoming, trustees should consider decanting
to update or otherwise improve the trusts.341 Three potential uses for decanting
include decanting into an APT or a QTIP, or modifying an existing GRAT.342
However, before decanting into or modifying an existing trust, trustees must
ensure the decanting would not trigger adverse tax consequences.343 Finally,
before a trustee makes a determination not to decant, the trustee should consider
whether they are potentially subject to a fiduciary duty to decant.344 Decanting
can serve a variety of interests and the advantages of Wyoming’s laws in this regard
should not be ignored.

334

Id. § 4-10-816(b).

Cf. id. § 4-10-801 (2019) (outlining a trustee’s duty to administer a trust “in good faith,
in accordance with . . . the interests of the beneficiaries”); see also id. § 4-10-1001 (“A violation by a
fiduciary of a duty the fiduciary owes to a beneficiary is a breach of trust.”).
335

336
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 4-10-1001. Such ambiguity supports a future amendment to § 4-10816, clarifying either way the duty to decant. See supra notes 92–104. For further discussion on the
duty to decant, see supra notes 322–36 and accompanying text.
337

See supra notes 15–56 and accompanying text.

338

See supra notes 2–8 and accompanying text.

339

See supra notes 89–100 and accompanying text.

340

See supra notes 89–100 and accompanying text.

341

See supra notes 183–90 and accompanying text.

342

See supra notes 192–208, 209–18, 219–93 and accompanying text.

343

See supra notes 294–321 and accompanying text.

344

See supra notes 322–36 and accompanying text.
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